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Abstract 
We study a New Keynesian model where banks create deposits through loans, subject to 
increasing marginal cost of lending. Banks do not intermediate commodity deposits between 
savers and borrowers, instead they offer a payment system that intermediates ledger-entry 
deposits between spenders and spenders. We discuss three implications. First, non-banks’ 
aggregate purchasing power consists not only of their income but also of new loans/deposits. 
Second, near the ZLB policy rate reductions compress spreads, and thereby reduce bank 
profitability, deposit creation and output. Third, near the ZLB Phillips curves are flatter 
because lower factor cost inflation is partly offset by inflationary credit rationing. 
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1. Introduction
This paper is a contribution to the post-GFC literature on the role of banks in the
macro-economy. As argued in Benes and Kumhof (2012), Jakab and Kumhof (2015, 2018) and
Faure and Gersbach (2017), this literature has been using, almost without exception,
“intermediation of loanable funds” (ILF) models, where banks are intermediaries between savers
and borrowers. In such models banks need to ﬁrst collect deposits of commodities, and in some
cases also of capital, from savers before they can lend those commodities to borrowers. These
models are fundamentally non-ﬁnancial, because banks are essentially warehouses that store,
borrow and lend commodities, and whose liabilities are commodity money. While at the
microeconomic or corporate ﬁnance level the ﬁnancial intermediaries of ILF models can be a very
useful representation of non-bank ﬁnancial institutions (NBFIs) that intermediate existing funds
between diﬀerent agents, at the macroeconomic level neither do NBFIs intermediate commodities
- they intermediate ﬁnancial balances, typically bank liabilities - nor do bank loans intermediate
existing funds - they create new funds via loan extension. The aim of the present paper is
therefore to replace the non-ﬁnancial ILF model with a ﬁnancial “ﬁnancing through money
creation” (FMC) model, and to study the macroeconomic implications. Moreover, unlike in the
FMC model of Jakab and Kumhof (2015, 2018), where a representative household interacts with
banks subject to a transactions cost technology, here we explicitly model the economic exchanges
between diﬀerent agents that require the use of bank deposits. In this model banks are indeed
intermediaries, but between spenders and spenders of money rather than between savers and
borrowers of commodities. Critically, FMC models do not propose to challenge and replace but
rather to use the many advances that have been made in the modelling of ﬁnancial institutions
themselves, because the crucial diﬀerence between ILF and FMC models is not found in the
optimisation problems of ﬁnancial institutions but in the budget constraints, or rather the
deposits-in-advance constraints, of their customers.
To demonstrate why deposit-taking and lending in ILF models represents real rather than
ﬁnancial transactions, we study a typical example of a ﬁnancial transaction. Assume that A, who
has an account at Bank A, has performed a service for B, who has an account at Bank B. In
return A receives a check drawn on B’s account, and deposits it in Bank A. The critical
observation is that this check only has value because the deposit already exists - in Bank B. The
transaction simply moves an existing deposit to a diﬀerent account within the banking system, it
does not create a new deposit for the banking system. Furthermore, it does not give Bank A
additional funds to lend, because by double-entry bookkeeping the new deposit is automatically
lent to Bank B at the moment it is received, in the form of an accounts receivable claim for the
collection of funds in the form of central bank reserves. The same logic applies to any deposit of
private ﬁnancial instruments into bank accounts - they are not loanable funds, and they are not
new funds. Central bank money (reserves or cash) deposited in banks does not represent loanable
funds either, because central bank reserves cannot be lent to non-banks, only to other banks,
while physical cash is never disbursed against new bank loans, only against preexisting electronic
deposits.1 But the only items that are ever deposited in bank accounts are private ﬁnancial
instruments and central bank money. What then is the meaning of deposit-taking and lending in
ILF models? The answer is that they always represent, literally, the accumulation of physical
commodities, in some cases augmented by the accumulation of physical capital (or of securities
that represent claims to physical capital). This can be seen very clearly in the budget constraints
1Overdrafts are not an exception. An overdraft represents the creation of a new bank deposit on demand. This
deposit can then be instantaneously withdrawn in the form of a check or cash.
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of banks’ depositors (and borrowers) in these models. In the most common budget constraint
changes in deposits equal the diﬀerence between physical income and physical expenditure, a
diﬀerence that clearly represents the physical accumulation, and then intermediation by way of
bank loans, of commodities. Banks are therefore warehouses, and because bank deposits are
always at least in part created via the physical accumulation of commodities, they represent
commodity money. The accumulation of physical capital augments but does not fundamentally
change this model, and furthermore, as discussed below, it plays only a very small role in
aggregate banking system data.
In FMC models banks are ﬁnancial institutions rather than warehouses, and money is an
accounting entry in the books of ﬁnancial institutions rather than a commodity. When it makes a
new loan, a bank simultaneously creates a new loan entry, in the name of customer X, on the
asset side of its balance sheet, which represents its right to receive future instalments and interest
on the loan, and a new and equal-sized deposit entry, also in the name of customer X, on the
liability side of its balance sheet, which represents its obligation to deliver current funds. The key
observation is that in the case of banks this newly-created “accounts payable” liability (IOU) to
deliver current funds can immediately be used as current funds, as money. Only banks are able to
do this, because only banks are perceived to be able to credibly commit to honouring their IOUs
universally (that is, vis-à-vis any subsequent holder of the IOU), thereby making these IOUs
acceptable as a universal medium of exchange. Part of the literature has argued that banks have
this ability because of their ability to diversify and thereby privately construct optimal portfolios
of liabilities that are perceived to be safe, or at least much safer than the alternatives. We would
argue that while this private mechanism is indeed present and plays an important role, explicit
and implicit public support for banking systems during crisis times is even more important, with
the quality of banks’ assets often only determining the ﬁscal cost of public support operations. In
fact, the entire system of central banks and regulatory agencies has been constructed with this as
its main objective, because trust in the nation’s main medium of exchange is considered critical for
the performance of the entire economy. The implicit assumption in our model is that this public
guarantee is exclusive to banks and is perceived to be completely credible, so that bank loans and
bank deposits are risk-free, and bank deposits are the only circulating medium of exchange. This
moves the emphasis away from bank asset-side considerations to an exclusive liability-side focus,
in other words to an exclusive focus on the monetary dimension of banks’ activity.
There is another way of stating the diﬀerence between ILF and FMC models in terms of balance
sheets. Banks in the ILF model record nonzero net non-ﬁnancial (physical) transactions, which
means that loans are conditional on deposits that are created through the saving of real resources,
and where loans represent an exchange of two real bank assets, existing warehoused commodities
against a repayment claim for future delivery of commodities. This notion is one of barter of
diﬀerent commodities against each other, and as such it originates in thinking of banks
analogously to non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. Banks in the FMC model record nonzero gross, but zero net,
ﬁnancial (monetary) transactions, which do not require prior saving of real resources, and where
loans represent the creation of new ﬁnancial assets that are funded by the simultaneous creation
of new ﬁnancial liabilities, new deposits against a repayment claim for future delivery of deposits.
In other words, deposits are conditional on loans that are created through ledger entries. The
bank’s customer experiences no impact change in his net balance sheet position vis-à-vis the
bank, but such transactions are nevertheless essential for the functioning of the real economy,
because the new bank liability represents an addition to the economy’s stock of money. But while
this money facilitates purchases and sales of physical resources outside the banking system, it is
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not itself a physical resource, and can be created at negligible resource cost. Money and
commodities circulate on two completely separate circuits, while the ILF model, which is based
on the notion of commodity money, conﬂates these two circuits.
The foregoing discussion illustrates that accounting is an indispensable tool for understanding the
economics of money and banking. The activity of banks consists almost entirely of the
proﬁt-maximising and risk-minimising creation and destruction of ledger entries.2 To understand
how these ledger entries are created, one has to understand accounting, because accounting is the
technology of banking.
The clearest explanations of the money creation process, which make exactly the same arguments
as in this paper, come from two reports by the Bank of England (McLeay et al. (2014a,b)), from
a number of papers by the Bank for International Settlements (see e.g. Borio and Disyatat (2011,
2015)), and from a report by the Bundesbank (Bundesbank (2017)). FMC models are now also
beginning to ﬁnd their way into the DSGE models of central banks and policy institutions,
including the International Monetary Fund (Benes et al. (2014a,b)), the Central Bank of Ireland
(Lozej et al. (2017), Lozej and Rannenberg (2017)), Norges Bank (Kravik and Paulsen (2017))
and People’s Bank of China (Sun and He (2018)).
The creation and destruction of credit and money through proﬁt-maximising double-entry
bookkeeping entries that is at the core of the FMC model also provides a very natural
explanation for the observed very large and rapid quarter-on-quarter changes in aggregate
banking sector balance sheets documented in Jakab and Kumhof (2015, 2018). These authors
discuss that ILF models, in order to rationalise these observations, must rely on a combination of
three mechanisms, ﬁrst the accumulation of commodities (real savings), second the accumulation
of physical capital (substitution between direct and indirect/bank holdings of physical capital),
and third valuation eﬀects on asset portfolios. They demonstrate that these mechanisms play only
a very small role in the data of major developed economies.
It is important to emphasise that when we refer to banks, bank loans and bank deposits, both
conceptually and in our formal model, we are thinking of the institutions, assets and liabilities of
the entire ﬁnancial system, which includes both banks and NBFIs. As shown in Pozsar (2014),
modern NBFIs are not creators of money but intermediaries of bank-created money. Banks are
the central actors in the overall ﬁnancial system, because their ability to create new money
implies that the system as a whole has the ability to create new money, even if a subset of
institutions only has the ability to use but not to create such money. It is therefore legitimate to
model the overall ﬁnancial system as consisting entirely of banks, but not to model it as
consisting entirely of NBFIs.
This paper introduces a bank-based monetary transactions mechanism, where bank deposits have
to be used in all of the economy’s payments, into an otherwise standard macroeconomic
environment. It does so by using a sequence of deposits-in-advance constraints.3 Simplifying for
the purpose of exposition4, inside each period loans are made to ﬁrms in order to create deposits
2Milton Friedman (1971, p. 2) states this very clearly: “The correct answer for [the question of the origin of] both
Euro-dollars and liabilities of US banks is that their major source is a bookkeeper’s pen.”
3Our deposits-in-advance constraint is akin to the cash-in-advance constraint, whose origins can be traced at
least as far back as Clower (1967). Other prominent examples of models with cash-in-advance constraints include
Grandmont and Younes (1972), Lucas and Stokey (1987), Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003) and Tsomocos (2003).
4The simpliﬁcation is that we abstract from payments to and from banks (interest) and government (taxes,
spending and bond purchases).
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that are needed to make two sets of successive payments. The ﬁrst is payments for wages, user
costs and proﬁt distributions from ﬁrms to households to pay for the production of output, and
the second is payments from households to ﬁrms to pay for the sale of output, with the second set
of payments extinguishing the loans. Because of the intra-period nature of this sequence, it
remains compatible with Jakab and Kumhof (2015, 2018), which merges workers and ﬁrms into a
single representative worker-ﬁrm in the spirit of Lucas (1990) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2004), and where the multiple deposits-in-advance constraints are replaced by a single
transactions cost technology.
This approach demonstrates clearly why ﬁnancing is so critical. Non-bank agents in the model
economy are not constrained by a budget constraint that limits their spending to their income,
but instead by a deposits-in-advance constraint that limits their spending to the sum of their
income and net new credit creation and therefore deposit creation. Income can be used for
spending because it is received in the form of spendable bank deposits, but bank deposits can also
be created through the granting of additional loans, independently of any prior income ﬂows. By
contrast, in ILF models the debt-ﬁnanced increase in the purchasing power of the borrower is
oﬀset by the diminished purchasing power of the lender, because a ﬁnite stock of commodities
changes hands between them, through the agency of banks. The foregoing does of course not
imply that banks allow agents to violate the economy’s overall resource constraint. Rather, the
creation of additional credit permits the mobilisation of additional resources that increase income,
especially when the economy starts in a ﬁnancially constrained situation.
Our own model studies the implications of a speciﬁc ﬁnancial constraint, the zero lower bound
(ZLB) on deposit interest rates, in part by comparing the behaviour of the ZLB-constrained
economy to that of an otherwise identical unconstrained economy. In the unconstrained economy
deposit interest rates adjust to achieve the spread that banks require in order to cover the cost of
making loans, so that loans respond highly elastically to changes in credit demand. At the ZLB
deposit interest rates can no longer adjust, and any change in the policy rate, which determines
banks’ lending rates, leads to a change in spreads, in their ability to cover the cost of making
loans, and therefore in the creation of credit and deposits. Loans are now unresponsive to changes
in credit demand.
In this ZLB-constrained environment higher policy interest rates are, ceteris paribus,
expansionary. Speciﬁcally, because banks’ proﬁt margins depend on nominal interest rate spreads,
a permanent increase in the nominal policy rate that does not depart from the fundamental level
of real interest rates, in other words a higher level of steady state inﬂation, implies a permanent
expansion in credit, deposits and output. Similarly, policies that give rise to a temporary increase
in inﬂation are, ceteris paribus, expansionary through this credit channel. The economy therefore
behaves in a highly monetarily non-neutral way, both in the short term and the long term. Of
course the argument that higher inﬂation can help to get an economy out of a deep recession is
not new, but our transmission mechanism, from inﬂation to spreads to deposit creation, with a
critical role of deposits in economic exchange and therefore in real activity, is new.
Furthermore, in the ZLB-constrained environment the drivers of inﬂation include not only
traditional marginal cost terms, consisting of wages and user costs, but also the multiplier of a
credit rationing constraint. Based on our empirical estimates, the supply of credit is highly
responsive to interest rate spreads, and this means that contractionary shocks, if accompanied by
a drop in the policy rate, tend to lead not only to a drop in traditional marginal cost terms but
also to tighter credit rationing. The latter, ceteris paribus, tends to have an inﬂationary rather
4
than a deﬂationary eﬀect, because credit rationing induces producers to charge higher prices, even
if they expect this to be at the expense of losing market share, because higher sales revenue allows
them to relax their credit rationing constraint. This oﬀsetting eﬀect implies that the inﬂation
response to shocks near the ZLB is much more subdued than away from the ZLB, while the
output response is ampliﬁed by credit rationing. In other words, the Phillips curve is much ﬂatter
near the ZLB.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the related theoretical and
empirical literatures. Section 3 presents empirical evidence on the elasticity of credit supply with
respect to lending spreads. Section 4 develops our theoretical models, one unconstrained model
and one ZLB-constrained model. Section 5 studies illustrative simulations based on these models.
Section 6 concludes.
2. Literature Review
In this section we review four strands of literature that are related to our paper. Section 2.1
reviews the recent theoretical macro literature on banking. Section 2.2 reviews the literature on
the distinction between income and purchasing power. Section 2.3 reviews the literature on
contractionary reductions in nominal policy interest rates near the ZLB. Section 2.4 reviews the
literature on ﬂat Phillips curves near the ZLB.
2.1. The Theoretical Macro Literature on Banking
In this section we review the recent theoretical macro literature on banking.5 We divide our
review into two parts, New Keynesian DSGE models and other macroeconomic theory models.
2.1.1. New Keynesian DSGE Models
In relation to our paper, recent DSGE models with ﬁnancial frictions can be divided into three
groups. In the ﬁrst group, all lending is direct and in the form of commodities. Because banks are
absent, this literature is far removed from the topic of this paper. It includes Iacoviello (2005),
which uses the borrowing constraint ﬁrst introduced by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and Jermann
and Quadrini (2012). In the second and third groups, banks are present, but lending is also in the
form of commodities. In the second group, banks’ net worth and balance sheets play no role in
the analysis, typically because all lending risk is diversiﬁable and the emphasis is on loan pricing.
This group includes Christiano et al. (2014), which uses the costly state veriﬁcation mechanism
ﬁrst introduced into macro models by Bernanke et al. (1999), as well as Cúrdia and Woodford
(2010), de Fiore et al. (2011) and Boissay et al. (2016). In the third group, banks’ balance sheets
and net worth do play a role, either through an incentive constraint under moral hazard or
through a regulatory constraint. This group includes Gerali et al. (2010), Gertler and Karadi
(2011), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011), Adrian and Boyarchenko (2013), Clerc et al. (2015), Nelson
et al. (2015), Justiniano et al. (2015), Benes and Kumhof (2015), Eggertsson et al. (2017) and
Nuño and Thomas (2017).
5An older literature on the credit channel view of monetary policy is summarised in Kashyap and Stein (1993)
and Kashyap et al. (1993). This paper will not discuss partial equilibrium corporate ﬁnance models of banking.
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2.1.2. Other Macroeconomic Theory Models
We classify models in this group by the three main mechanisms for aggregate bank balance sheet
growth that have been identiﬁed in the literature. The ﬁrst mechanism is the ex-nihilo creation or
destruction of ledger entries (FMC), the second is the acquisition, sale or revaluation of existing
real assets or of securities that represent claims to such assets (SEC), and the third is the saving
of physical commodities (SAV). Other than our own previous work (Benes and Kumhof (2012),
Jakab and Kumhof (2015, 2018)) and the related work at central banks cited in Section 1, to our
knowledge only two papers, Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) and Faure and Gersbach (2017),
are based exclusively on the FMC mechanism. In Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) loans create
deposits that enter a cash-in-advance constraint on consumption. Because the model features a
real loan production function, impulse responses for ﬁnancial shocks have a much stronger real
ﬂavour than in our model. Faure and Gersbach (2017), in a 2-period model, show that in the
absence of uncertainty ILF and FMC models imply identical allocations. This is related to the
result in Jakab and Kumhof (2015, 2018) that the deterministic steady states of the two model
classes are identical. The three-period model of Donaldson et al. (2018) is based on a combination
of the FMC and SAV mechanisms for balance sheet growth. As in FMC models, banks issue book
money (“fake receipts”) through risky lending. But as in ILF models, banks also need to function
as warehouses that issue commodity money (“commodities receipts”), because warehoused
commodities are required as collateral. The paper has at its heart an excellent explanation of the
ability of banks to create money through lending. However, physical warehousing is almost
completely absent in modern ﬁnancial systems.6 The model could be turned into an exclusively
FMC model by assuming either risk-free uncollateralised loans, commodities collateral without
physical warehousing, or other and far more common forms of collateral such as real estate.
Piazzesi and Schneider (2018) is based on a combination of all three mechanisms for bank balance
sheet growth. Linear utility and ﬂexible prices ensure that the dynamic eﬀects of idiosyncratic
deposit withdrawal shocks are instantaneous, so that the analysis can concentrate on steady state
comparisons. Bank deposits are created through non-banks’ real saving and the purchase of Lucas
trees by banks from non-banks. But households can also obtain liquidity through intraday loans,
which are close relatives of the fake receipts of Donaldson et al. (2018). While both purchases of
trees and intraday loans can generate rapid changes in the size of bank balance sheets, they are
not strictly necessary in this model because of the simultaneous presence of linear consumption
utility, which implies that households are able to supply real savings with the same elasticity with
which banks are able to supply ledger entries. Chari and Phelan (2014) is based on a combination
of the SEC and SAV mechanisms, with bank deposits that are used as a medium of exchange for
consumption purposes, but created through a combination of asset purchases from and the
accumulation of real savings by households. This is not fundamentally diﬀerent from simpler ILF
models without the SEC mechanism, ﬁrst because the SEC mechanism plays a very small role
empirically, and second because of the conceptual problems with the SAV mechanism discussed in
Section 1. The bank run model of Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015) is also based on a combination of
the SEC and SAV mechanisms, with ﬁre sales of securities and valuation losses playing a major
role in the evolution of bank balance sheets during runs. But in other respects this model does
not ﬁt neatly into our classiﬁcation. The reason is that these authors divide their economy into
shadow banks, who experience runs, and a combination of commercial banks and nonbanks, who
run, while the aggregate ﬁnancing of nonbank borrowers, the main object of interest of our paper,
remains constant throughout. This choice is appropriate for the study of ﬁnancial crises, where
6Custodial services do not qualify because custodial items are held in trust and not on bank balance sheets.
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securities transactions between diﬀerent parts of the ﬁnancial sector have played a critical role
even though securities transactions between the ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial sectors and valuation
losses have only played a minor role for the aggregate ﬁnancial sector, as shown in Jakab and
Kumhof (2018). Gertler et al. (2015) builds on Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015) but divides the
economy into three groups, shadow banks, commercial banks and households. In this model
changes in the size of the aggregate ﬁnancial sector’s balance sheet can be quantiﬁed, and are due
to changes in direct holdings of securities (capital) by households. Bigio and Weill (2016) is based
exclusively on a variant of the SEC mechanism. In this three-period two-state model banks buy
high-risk illiquid assets from producers in exchange for issuing low-risk liquid deposits, thereby
allowing producers to hire additional workers who will not accept to be paid in high-risk assets.
At the ﬁnal stage however bankers settle their deposit contracts using the real returns on their
assets, so that banks are still intermediaries of physical commodities, and workers still buy the
output of producers using physical commodities. This could however be addressed by allowing for
a variant of the FMC mechanism in this paper, with workers spending their deposits to buy
output from producers, and producers using these deposits to repurchase the illiquid assets.
Another diﬀerence is that Bigio and Weill (2016) emphasise the asset side of banks, with private
portfolio diversiﬁcation permitting the issuance of low-risk liabilities, while our paper exclusively
emphasises the liability side, with loans assumed to be completely risk-free. This permits a
signiﬁcantly more tractable (and inﬁnite horizon) model. In Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2016),
unlike Bigio and Weill (2016) and this paper, bank liabilities serve exclusively as a low-risk store
of value, while economic exchange is still performed using commodities. Bianchi and Bigio (2014)
is based exclusively on the SAV mechanism, with banks intermediating real savings between
households and ﬁrms. While in this model loans and deposits can experience large jumps, the
reason is not an FMC framework but the assumption of an inﬁnitely elastic supply of real savings.
While this implies an extreme behaviour of consumption, it facilitates a clearer focus on the main
topic of the paper, the interaction between monetary policy and the interbank market.
2.2. Income, Credit and Purchasing Power
In ILF models purchasing power at any given point in time consists of real resources and is, at the
aggregate level, constrained by current income received in the form of commodities. Lending does
not relax this constraint, because it transfers commodities from lenders to borrowers, so that any
increase in the purchasing power of borrowers is oﬀset by a corresponding reduction in the
purchasing power of their lenders. By contrast, in FMC models aggregate purchasing power
equals current income plus net new credit, because in this case the debt-ﬁnanced increase in the
purchasing power of borrowers is not oﬀset by a fall in the purchasing power of other agents. The
reason is that the new purchasing power is created ex nihilo by an equal increase in the assets and
the liabilities of the banking sector. This emphasis on the distinction between income and
purchasing power can be traced back to some of the leading economists of the past, including
Schumpeter (1934), Keynes (1939) and Kaldor (1989). This tradition continues in the
Post-Keynesian literature, which emphasises the ability of commercial banks to create endogenous
money that adds to agents’ purchasing power, and the importance of this mechanism for
monetary and ﬁnancial stability, see e.g. Minsky (1977), Moore (1979), Lavoie (2014) and Keen
(2014, 2015). Keen argues that endogenous money plays a crucial role in Minsky’s development of
the Financial Instability Hypothesis.7
7Bhattacharya et al. (2015) formalise some of Minsky’s intuition, by modelling endogenous default and endogenous
demand for credit and money.
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2.3. Contractionary Reductions in Nominal Policy Rates
One of the key conclusions of our paper is that near the ZLB a reduction in the nominal policy
interest rate ceteris paribus reduces output. The reason is that it reduces banks’ lending margins,
credit extension and deposit creation, and that all real activity depends on deposits-based
economic exchange.
In the theoretical literature, the paper by Brunnermeier and Koby (2018) makes a closely related
point. It argues that a drop in the policy rate on the one hand increases the net return on
high-interest legacy assets while on the other hand squeezing the net interest margin on new
loans. Below a “reversal interest rate”, which however does not need to be located at zero, the
latter eﬀect starts to dominate, so that accommodative monetary policy becomes contractionary.
The paper requires a number of assumptions about the pattern of interest semi-elasticities of loan
and deposit demands, the exogenous presence of legacy assets on the balance sheet and
pre-endowed banking equity in order to determine the reversal interest rate. Our model is
considerably simpler and has a diﬀerent transmission mechanism, the rationing of money creation
when deposit interest rates are at their lower bound, which for many countries has indeed been
located at zero. Also, Brunnermeier and Koby (2018) focus exclusively on the banking sector and
take the rest of the economy, including loan and deposit demands, as given, while our model also
describes the general equilibrium interaction between the banking sector and the real economy.
Eggertsson et al. (2017) empirically document a collapse in pass-through from policy rates to
other rates, especially to deposit rates, once the policy rate turns negative, and provide a New
Keynesian model where negative policy rates either have a neutral or a contractionary eﬀect on
aggregate demand. The contractionary eﬀect occurs under the additional assumption that an
intermediation cost function depends negatively on bank proﬁts. Under this assumption, because
charging negative interest rates on reserves reduces bank proﬁts, it increases intermediation costs
and thereby lending rates, and this reduces aggregate demand. The main diﬀerence between this
paper and ours is that Eggertsson et al. (2017) is an ILF model where banks intermediate
commodities between savers and borrowers, with deposits that require physical saving and that
themselves do not play a monetary role. The transmission mechanism from lower policy rates to
the real economy is therefore diﬀerent from ours.
The empirical literature documents the eﬀects of long periods at the ZLB on banks’ equity and
lending in many countries around the world. Landier et al. (2013) focus on the US case, and show
that banks retain signiﬁcant exposure to interest rate risk, that an increase in the Fed funds rate
near the ZLB induces banks to increase their quarterly earnings, and that this is in turn
associated with stronger bank lending. This is consistent with our theoretical predictions. Heider
et al. (2017) focus on the euro area, and show that when central banks reduce the policy rate to
zero or below, banks are reluctant to pass on negative rates to depositors, leading to a reduction
of proﬁts and lending, particularly among low risk banks, and to “search for yield” among high
risk banks. By contrast, when monetary policy rates are signiﬁcantly positive this mechanism is
of no importance. The latter is consistent with our unconstrained model. Basten and
Mariathasan (2018) focus on Switzerland, and show that negative interest rates have eroded bank
equity. Gerstenberger and Schnabl (2017) focus on Japan, and show that low interest rates have
compressed banks’ interest margins. Claessens et al. (2017), in a sample of 3385 banks from 47
countries from 2005 to 2013, demonstrate that drops in policy rates adversely aﬀect banks’ net
interest margins and proﬁtability. Ampudia and Van den Heuvel (2017) show that the decrease in
policy rates at the onset of the crisis boosted banks’ stock prices, but that the eﬀects reversed
during the recent period with low and even negative policy rates.
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On the policy front, in 2016 the Bank of England voiced concerns very similar to the ones
expressed in this paper, namely that absent additional policy measures further reductions in
policy rates might not be fully transmitted to the real economy, because of an erosion in banks’
intermediation margin near the ZLB (Bank of England (2016a,b)). The rate cut decision at that
time was therefore complemented by the introduction of the Term Funding Scheme (TFS), which
provided low-interest funding and additional incentives to banks to help ensure that the rate cut
was fully passed through to households and companies, without perverse eﬀects of lower rates on
lending.
2.4. Flattening of the Phillips Curve
Since the GFC of 2008, output has in many countries remained far below the pre-recession trend,
unemployment has remained stubbornly high and inﬂation has not fallen by as much as
anticipated. In other words, there has been a post-crisis ﬂattening of the Phillips curve. Figure 1
shows the US data. A large literature has studied the reasons for this8, but it has not yet
converged on a consensus view.
One popular explanation points to the better anchoring of inﬂation expectations due to central
bank gains in credibility. Blanchard et al. (2015) and Blanchard (2016) provide empirical evidence
suggesting that the ﬂattening of the Phillips curve started in the 1980’s, and that the slope did
not decline further after the crisis. The main reason for the ﬂattening of the curve, they argue, is
a better anchoring of inﬂation expectations. This argument is challenged by Kiley (2015), who
argues that the anchoring of inﬂation expectations is insuﬃcient to account for all the inﬂation
inactivity after the crisis. Similarly, Ball and Mazumder (2011) show that the anchoring of
inﬂation expectations can account for the decline of the slope, but only on the strong assumption
that expectations stay anchored at 2.5 % for several years when actual inﬂation was less than 1%.
Another explanation attributes the phenomenon to (typically real) shocks. Leduc and Wilson
(2017) use cross-city data in the US to show that there was a decline in the slope of the Phillips
curve after the crisis. They argue that this was caused by shocks and that the ﬂattening should
be short-lived, with the slope returning to normal once the economy recovers. Laseen and Sanjani
(2016) also argue that changes in shocks are a more salient feature of US data than changes in
coeﬃcients. Speciﬁcally, they argue that exogenous cost-push shocks stopped inﬂation from
falling, so that the claim that the Phillips curve has ﬂattened would be incorrect.
A related set of explanations emphasises longer-term structural changes. Gordon (2013) argues
that there has been an increase in the natural rate of unemployment, and that the Phillips curve
is alive and well. Christiano et al. (2015), using a DSGE model, attribute the decline in inﬂation
relative to pre-1996 norms to a decline in the growth rate of technology, not to a ﬂat Phillips
curve. Another possibility, studied by De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017) and De Loecker et al.
(2016), is that competition has declined in the markets for goods and services, leading to a drop
in supply and an increase in price markups. Coibion et al. (2017) and Coibion and
Gorodnichenko (2015) call for a reconsideration of the formation of inﬂation expectations to
account for the missing disinﬂation. Some papers also suggest that the reduced form of the
Phillips curve would look ﬂat even when the structural form produces a steeper slope. This has
been explored by Ball and Mazumder (2011) and by Del Negro et al. (2015).
8See International Monetary Fund (2013) for a survey.
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The only paper that, to our knowledge, relates the ﬂattening of the Phillips curve to ﬁnancial
frictions is Gilchrist et al. (2017), who show that ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms increased prices in
2008 while their unconstrained counterparts cut prices. Based on a theoretical model they argue
that ﬁrms which face a higher external ﬁnance premium ﬁnd it optimal to raise prices even if this
implies a sacriﬁce of future market share, because an improvement in revenue and thus in cash
ﬂow reduces the need for external ﬁnancing. This rationale for price increases is similar to ours
while the nature of the ﬁnancial friction is diﬀerent. In our model bank credit rationing near the
ZLB leads to reduced deposit creation, while in Gilchrist et al. (2017) ﬁnancial market credit
rationing leads to higher external ﬁnance premia. Also, the argument of Gilchrist et al. (2017)
focuses on the episode of the crisis itself, which was characterised by high credit spreads, whereas
our argument is mainly concerned with the post-crisis ZLB period, which was characterised by
much lower spreads.
3. Estimation of the Spread Semi-Elasticity of Loan Supply
Our objective in this section is to estimate the semi-elasticity of loan supply with respect to the
lending spread, because this is a key input into our model calibration and simulation. We collect
US data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Call Reports, Datastream, and the Fed
Loan Survey. Table 1 lists the data. The dependent variable is the log of real balances of
commercial and industrial (C&I) loans from the US Flow of Funds. The corresponding spread is
the spread on C&I loans net of smoothed charge-oﬀs. This is a FISIM interest rate spread
calculated using the methodology of Kyle Hood (2013).9 The advantage of using a FISIM spread
is that it approximates the average interest rate spread on the entirety of C&I loans. To control
for endogeneity, we use standard 2SLS and instrument the spread using three candidate
instrumental variables (IV) that are correlated with the demand for C&I loans, namely the
purchasing manager index (PMI), nonﬁnancial business investment (INV E) and the percentage
of banks reporting stronger loan demand in the Fed loan survey (DEMAND). The latter turns
out to be the best IV according to standard criteria, with a four-quarter lag giving the best ﬁt.
We introduce three controls that capture shifts of the supply of C&I loans that are independent of
the spread, the one-quarter lags of the growth rate of real GDP (∆gdp), banks’ liquid to total
assets ratio (liquidity), and the percentage of banks reporting tightening lending standards to
large and medium ﬁrms (supply).
Table 2 reports estimation results for the instrument DEMANDt−4.
10 The interpretation of the
coeﬃcient on the lending spread is that a 1 percentage point increase in the spread is associated
with, ceteris paribus, a 10 percent increase in the level of loans. This will be treated as the
baseline value of the short-term semi-elasticity for our model simulations. We do not consider this
to be a surprisingly large value, given that a 1 percentage point change in the spread is very large
compared to historically observed average spreads for the banking system. Additional
considerations apply for the semi-elasticity over the longer run, because banks can over time
adapt their business models in order to keep lending despite lower spreads, for example by
9FISIM stands for Financial Intermediation Services Indirectly Measured in the System of National Accounts. It
is an estimate of the value of the services provided by ﬁnancial intermediaries, measured by multiplying loans and
deposits by FISIM loan and FISIM deposit rate margins, both relative to a common reference rate. We are grateful
to Kyle Hood for his support in performing the FISIM calculations.
10Estimation results for the other instruments are available upon request, and produce estimation results for the
elasticity that are as large or larger than the one reported in Table 2.
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increasing non-interest income. For the purpose of simulating permanent shocks, we therefore
assume that the baseline long-term semi-elasticity equals 5 instead of 10.
The actual evolution of US spreads around the period of the 2008 GFC is shown in Figure 2. We
observe that immediately after the crisis all interest rates dropped along with the Fed Funds rate.
But the drop in the lending rate was far faster, and followed the Fed Funds rate much more
closely. In our model it will follow the Fed Funds rate one for one. The deposit rate on the other
hand adjusted much more slowly and was bounded below by zero rather than becoming negative.
The consequence of the much faster drop in the lending rate along with the Fed Funds rate was a
signiﬁcant compression in spreads in the two years following the crisis. Spreads did recover later
on, due to a combination of deposit rates gradually closing the remaining gap to the ZLB and
lending rates starting to exhibit a larger spread relative to the Fed Funds rate. The latter is not
part of our model, and accounting for it would make the ZLB less binding over the longer run.
However, it does appear to be a clear feature of the data that this process takes time, so that the
assumption of a ﬁxed lending spread relative to the policy rate seems appropriate for the analysis
of transitory shocks. Furthermore, even by 2016 spreads remained low relative to historical
averages, so that some part of the compression in spreads may remain until the economy exits
from the ZLB.
4. The Model
4.1. Overview
The model economy consists of four sets of agents, banks, ﬁrms, households and government. One
period represents one quarter. Upper/lower case symbols represent nominal/real variables. For
simplicity we assume that the trend real growth rate and the steady state inﬂation rate equal zero.
The economy is intertemporally linked through households’ holdings of government bonds and
physical capital. However, the issuance and retirement of deposit money by banks remains a
purely intratemporal process, with new deposits issued by banks at the beginning of each period,
and the same deposits being retired, or destroyed, at the end of that period. Figure 3 summarises
the intra-period ﬂows of deposits. Each period begins with the realisation of aggregate shocks, the
central bank announcement of the policy interest rate, and the government announcement of the
labour income tax rate. Immediately after this banks make loans that create deposits for ﬁrms.
No further deposit creation is permitted inside the period. Banks subsequently provide a costless
payment system that the four sets of agents must use to make payments to each other by way of
deposit transfers. Banks and the central bank participate in a market for central bank reserves,
which banks must use to settle payments imbalances, and with reserve balances paying the policy
rate. Banks also have access to the market for government bonds on an intra-period basis, which
facilitates interest rate arbitrage between the policy rate and the interest rate on government
bonds. Households and government can hold/issue government bonds intertemporally. Firms,
once their deposits have been created, face a deposits-in-advance constraint whereby they need to
use deposits to make payments ahead of producing commodities. They make payments for wages,
rental costs and dividends11 to households and for loan interest to banks, where it is assumed that
11 It could alternatively be assumed that monopolistic proﬁts can only be paid out after production has taken place.
However, it can be shown that this does not materially change the results, while the exposition under our assumption
is considerably simpliﬁed.
11
banks immediately pass those payments through to households as lump-sum dividends.12
Households, after receiving deposits from ﬁrms, are subject to a deposits-in-advance constraint
whereby they need to use deposits to make payments ahead of consuming commodities. They
make payments for private consumption, private investment and investment adjustment costs to
ﬁrms. They also need to make payments (labour income taxes, purchases of net new government
bonds) to government by way of deposits, and government, once it has received these deposits,
needs to use them to make payments to ﬁrms (government consumption) and households (interest
on government debt). Once households and government have paid ﬁrms for their newly produced
commodities, all circulating deposits have returned to ﬁrms and ﬁrms repay their loans in full.
Banks’ balance sheets vanish for an instant before the beginning of the next period.
In this economy all money is endogenous deposit money, with no exogenous endowment of
commodity money or of government ﬁat money. The price level is nevertheless determinate,
through what Calvo (2012, 2016) refers to as the price theory of money, whose origin he traces
back to Keynes’ General Theory. In this theory money derives its liquidity and positive
purchasing power from the existence of sticky commodity prices, which provide an output backing
to money. Speciﬁcally, when banks create new nominal deposit money balances this translates to
an increase in real money balances because sticky prices guarantee that the purchasing power over
commodities of the new money cannot be immediately inﬂated away by changes in the price level.
4.2. Banks
There is a continuum of banks of measure 1, with an individual bank indexed by j. Bank loans
Lt(j) that charge an interest rate iℓt create deposit money D
f
t (j) that pays an interest rate i
d
t ,
subject to an increasing and convex marginal cost of making loans C(Lt(j)).13 Deposit creation is
performed exclusively for ﬁrms and exclusively at the beginning of each period. This helps to
keep the model tractable but can be generalised.
Banks are ex-ante identical, and therefore make identical loans to ﬁrms, both in terms of quantity
and pricing. Their customers spread their deposit balances evenly across banks, so that any
subsequent payments between non-banks do not lead to individual banks being short or long in
deposits, and therefore in central bank reserves. We make the simplifying assumption that there
is no diﬀerence between the interest rates on central bank reserve deposits and reserve loans, so
that it becomes unnecessary to explicitly model the market for reserves. The interest rate on
reserves, and therefore the interest rate on interbank loans (of reserves), will be referred to as the
policy rate, and denoted by it. With the foregoing assumptions, all banks have identical balance
sheets at all times, with loans equalling deposits and zero positions in the market for reserves. If
an individual bank deviated from this equilibrium, by making more or fewer loans than other
banks, this would have its balance sheet counterpart in a short or long position in the interbank
market. This is however ruled out by arbitrage.
Speciﬁcally, competition between banks ensures that no individual bank has an incentive to
deviate, by eliminating the possibility of proﬁting from making more or fewer loans. This
incentive is eliminated when the interest rate on loans equals the marginal cost of funding
additional loans through the interbank market, iℓt = it. In the data actual lending rates are
12These dividends represent a conversion of bank equity (earned through loan interest) into bank deposits that are
then transferred to households.
13For another use of an exogenous intermediation cost function see Eggertsson et al. (2017).
12
generally higher than the policy rate, and our model could be generalised to account for this by
adding risk-based markups, but at considerable costs in model complexity. This would however
have the beneﬁt of allowing the model to account for situations where policy rates have reached
zero while lending rates remain above zero.
The interest rate on government bonds also has to equal the policy rate by arbitrage. Banks,
together with the central bank/government, have intra-period access to both the market for
reserves and the government bond market. If the two interest rates did not coincide banks would
be able to make proﬁts by taking long positions in one market and short positions in the other.
Absent arbitrage opportunities, there is no demand from banks for a nonzero net supply of
reserves, and reserves have no implications for the government budget.
An important question concerns the recipient of the interest paid on deposits. We observe that
money circulates inside each period, so that any deposit is held by multiple agents before it is
destroyed at the end of the period. The assignment of the recipient of deposit interest is therefore
necessarily arbitrary. For simplicity and ease of interpretation, we assume that all deposit interest
is received by ﬁrms. This ensures that the spread enters in a single location in the model, namely
in the Phillips curve. It represents the opportunity cost of having banks create money for ﬁrms,
with the beneﬁt being the relaxation of ﬁrms’ deposits-in-advance constraint.
There is free entry into banking. Bank proﬁts Πbt(j) consist of two elements, the interest rate
spread between loans and deposits

it − i
d
t

Lt(j) and the cost of making loans C(Lt(j)). The
proﬁt maximisation problem is
Max
Lt(j)
Πbt(j) =

it − i
d
t

Lt(j)−C(Lt(j)) . (1)
We assume that C(Lt(j)) represents a lump-sum transfer to households rather than a resource
cost. Because banks also transfer their proﬁts to households, total receipts of households from
bank j equal

it − i
d
t

Lt(j). We assume that C(Lt(j)) is increasing at an increasing rate in the
quantity of loans:
C(Lt(j)) =
κ
1 + 1
ξ
Ptℓ
tgt
t

Lt(j)
Ptℓ
tgt
t
1+1
ξ
. (2)
The target loan volume ℓtgtt is a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process with a steady state value of ℓ¯
tgt.
Shocks to this process change the loan supply at a given interest rate spread. We will refer to this
as the autonomous loan supply, and its economic interpretation is as an exogenous shock to banks’
willingness to extend loans. In equilibrium all banks face identical problems and make identical
choices, so that the index j can be dropped in the loan optimality condition, which is given by
ℓt = ℓ
tgt
t

it − i
d
t
κ
ξ
, (3)
with idt = 1 at the ZLB. This shows that away from the ZLB credit supply responds highly
elastically to credit demand, as idt can adjust so that the bank can accommodate credit demand
while making zero proﬁts at the margin, and that at the ZLB credit supply does not respond at
all to credit demand, as ℓt must adjust so that the bank can continue to make zero proﬁts at the
margin. The parameter ξ plays a critical role for the quantity of loans at the ZLB, while it mainly
determines the evolution of deposit interest rates away from the ZLB. The equation (3) can be
used to compute the spread semi-elasticity of the supply of loans with respect to the spread,
d ln

ℓt/ℓ¯

/dıˆt, where ıˆt =

it − idt

∗ 400, as a function of ξ. Following the empirical results of
Section 3 we set this elasticity equal to 10, meaning that loan supply increases by 10 percent for a
1 percentage point increase in the spread.
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4.3. Firms
There is a continuum of ﬁrms of measure 1, with an individual ﬁrm indexed by j. Each ﬁrm
produces output yt (j) at price Pt (j), subject to monopolistic competition and stickiness in
inﬂation. Aggregate output yt is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate over varieties yt(j), with elasticity of
substitution θ, and the corresponding aggregate price level and inﬂation rate are Pt and πt. Real
inﬂation adjustment costs are given by
GP,t(j) =
φp
2
yt
 Pt(j)Pt−1(j)
πt−1
− 1
2 , (4)
where φp calibrates the degree of inﬂation stickiness. Each ﬁrm hires labour ht(j) and capital
Kt(j) at competitive nominal/real prices Wt/wt and Rkt /r
k
t . Aggregate labour ht and capital Kt
are integrals over ht(j) and Kt(j), respectively. The ﬁrm obtains loans to satisfy a
deposits-in-advance constraint, and pays a gross nominal interest rate of it on the loans while
earning a gross nominal interest rate of idt on the corresponding deposits. The nominal proﬁt of
ﬁrm j is therefore given by
ΠFt (j) = Pt(j)yt(j)−Wtht(j)−R
k
tKt(j)− Lt(j)(it − i
d
t )− PtGP,t(j) . (5)
The deposits-in-advance constraint of ﬁrm j states that it needs to use its deposits Dft (j) to pay
net interest to its bank, wages to its workers, rental costs to its providers of capital and dividends
to its shareholders, all ahead of production. Using the equality Dft (j) = Lt(j) we therefore have
the constraint
Lt(j)  Lt(j)(it − i
d
t ) +Wtht(j) +R
k
tKt(j) + Π
F
t (j) . (6)
The left-hand side of this constraint represents the total liquidity generated for the ﬁrm by the
bank. The right-hand side represents the payments made with these deposits. We adopt the
notation Dhbt (j) = Lt(j)(it − i
d
t ) (deposits to cover net interest payments, which are received by
banks from ﬁrms and then by households from banks), Dhft (j) =Wtht(j) +R
k
tKt(j) (deposits to
cover wage and user cost payments, which are received by households from ﬁrms) and
Dhmt (j) = Π
F
t (j) (deposits to cover ﬁrm payouts of monopolistic proﬁts, which are received by
households from ﬁrms). Inﬂation adjustment costs PtGP,t(j) are paid by ﬁrms to each other, and
therefore do not change the bank deposits of the aggregate ﬁrm sector. The deposits-in-advance
constraint must be binding in equilibrium, because the opportunity cost to ﬁrms of having banks
create idle deposit balances for them, the spread it − i
d
t , is positive by the bank’s optimisation
problem. As to whether current income or net new credit ﬁnances spending, the key observation
is that prior to starting production ﬁrms’ current income equals zero, and it is only the extension
of new credit that allows the production cycle to start.
Combining (5) and (6), we obtain the ﬁnal form of the deposits-in-advance constraint:
Lt(j)  Pt(j)yt(j)− PtGP,t(j) . (7)
The ﬁrm’s technology is standard, with the supply of output yst (j) given by
yst (j) = S
a
t ht(j)
1−αKt(j)
α , (8)
where α calibrates the capital share in output and Sat is a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process for
total factor productivity. Standard optimisation with imperfectly substitutable output varieties
yields the demand for output ydt (j),
ydt (j) = (Pt(j))
−θ (Pt)
θ yt ,
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where in equilibrium ydt (j) = y
s
t (j). The optimisation problem of ﬁrms is
Max
{Pt(j),ht(j),Kt(j),Lt(j)}∞t=0
E0
∞
t=0
βtΛht

(Pt(j))
1−θ (Pt)
θ yt −Wtht(j)−R
k
tKt(j)−Lt(j)(it − i
d
t ) (9)
−
φP
2
Ptyt
 Pt(j)Pt−1(j)
πt−1
− 1
2 −MCt (Pt(j))−θ (Pt)θ yt − Sat ht(j)1−αKt(j)α
+ηft
Lt(j)− (Pt(j))1−θ (Pt)θ yt + φP
2
Ptyt
 Pt(j)Pt−1(j)
πt−1
− 1
2
−ηbt

Lt(j)− Ptℓ
tgt
t

it − i
d
t
κ
ξ
,
where β is the household intertemporal discount factor and Λht is the multiplier of the household’s
nominal budget constraint. The corresponding multiplier of the real budget constraint is λht . The
ﬁrm maximises the present discounted value of its proﬁts subject to three constraints. First,
aggregate supply must equal aggregate demand, with a multiplier on this constraint of MCt,
which denotes nominal marginal cost. Second, the deposits-in-advance constraint (7) must hold,
with a multiplier of ηft . Third, banks’ participation constraint (3), or credit rationing constraint
14,
must hold, with a multiplier of ηbt . This third constraint behaves diﬀerently depending on whether
the economy is at the ZLB. Namely, away from the ZLB the interest rate idt is free to vary to
achieve the spread that is necessary for the bank to elastically accommodate loan demand.
Therefore, there is no credit rationing and ηbt = 0. At the ZLB, we have i
d
t = 1 so that in general
ηbt > 0. In this case, changes in η
b
t depend on relative changes in loan supply and loan demand.
The ﬁrm’s optimality conditions for capital and labour are standard, and we do not show them
here to conserve space. But the Phillips curve is now aﬀected by credit rationing
µmct
(1− ηft )
−1 = φp (µ− 1)

πt
πt−1
− 1

πt
πt−1
−β
λht+1
λht
yt+1
yt
(1− ηft+1)
(1− ηft )
φp (µ− 1)

πt+1
πt
− 1

πt+1
πt
= 0 ,
(10)
where mct is real marginal cost and µ = θ/ (θ − 1). The optimality condition for loans is
it − i
d
t = η
f
t − η
b
t . (11)
Away from the ZLB this simpliﬁes to 1− ηft = 1− it + i
d
t , so that the Phillips curve is directly
aﬀected only by the lending spread, with no role for quantity rationing of credit. On the other
hand, at the ZLB we have 1− ηft = 2− it − η
b
t , in other words the multiplier on the credit
rationing constraint directly enters the Phillips curve.
4.4. Households
There is a continuum of households of measure 1, with an individual household indexed by j.
Households maximise their lifetime utility over consumption ct(j) and hours worked ht(j), subject
to consumption demand shocks Sct that follow a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process, and with
14 In our terminology credit rationing refers to quantity rationing rather than price rationing of credit.
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intertemporal elasticity of substitution ǫ, external habit persistence v, a weight on labour
disutility of χ, and a labour supply elasticity of 1:
Max
{ct(j),ht(j),It(j),kt(j),Bt(j)}
∞
t=0
E0
∞
t=0
βt[Sct (1− v)
1
ǫ
(ct(j)− vct−1)
1− 1
ǫ
1− 1
ǫ
−
χ
2
ht(j)
2] . (12)
Households accumulate nominal government bonds Bt(j) and physical capital kt(j), with nominal
net returns it − 1 and R
k
t . Net interest on government bonds held between periods t and t+ 1 is
received in period t, with only the principal settled in period t+ 1. This treatment of interest is
equivalent to the treatment of private loan (and deposit) interest. The diﬀerence is that loans are
always repaid in full before being renewed while government debt is not.
All household income and expenditure payments are made in the form of bank deposits.
Households receive factor incomes Wtht(j) and R
k
t kt−1(j) and lump-sum dividend incomes
Dhmt (j) and D
hb
t (j). Their ﬁrst deposits-in-advance constraint is that these incomes must be
suﬃcient to cover gross payments to the government:
Wtht(j) +R
k
t kt−1(j) +D
hm
t (j) +D
hb
t (j) ≥ Bt(j)−Bt−1(j) +Wtht(j)τL,t . (13)
In our simulations this constraint is never binding. For future reference, we denote the net
aggregate deposits collected by the government from households by Dght = Bt −Bt−1 +WthtτL,t.
Households’s second deposits-in-advance constraint is that their factor and dividend incomes
minus net payments (net of interest received) to the government must be suﬃcient to cover
payments for commodities purchases to ﬁrms, which include consumption Ptct(j), investment
PtIt(j) and investment adjustment costs PtGI,t(j), where real investment adjustment costs equal
GI,t(j) =
φI
2
It

It(j)
It−1(j)
− 1
2
, (14)
and where φI calibrates the degree of investment inertia. We therefore have
Wtht(j) +R
k
t kt−1(j) +D
hm
t (j) +D
hb
t (j) +Bt(j)(it − 1)− (Bt(j)−Bt−1(j))−Wtht(j)τL,t ≥
(15)
Ptct(j) + PtIt(j) + PtGI,t(j) .
This deposits-in-advance constraint is binding in equilibrium as long as the opportunity cost to
households of investing in idle and (for households) zero interest deposit balances, the net interest
rate on government bonds it − 1, is kept positive at all times. This will be true in all our
simulations. If it was not, it would result in the complete cessation of bank lending and therefore
of real activity. In the case of households spending is ﬁnanced entirely through current income
because they only have access to the payment system. Of course in a richer model households
could also have access to bank credit. Finally, the accumulation equation for physical capital is
given by the law of motion
kt(j) = (1− δ)kt−1(j) + It(j) , (16)
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital. The household problem as set up here is standard for
New Keynesian models. All optimality conditions are therefore also standard, and we do not show
them here to conserve space.
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4.5. Government
The government’s deposits-in-advance constraint is given by
Dght ≥ Bt (it − 1) + Ptgt . (17)
This constraint must be binding in equilibrium because the cost to government of borrowing to
acquire idle and (for government) zero interest deposit balances, the net interest rate it − 1, is
positive at all times by the arguments of subsection 4.4. Government spending is ﬁnanced entirely
through current income, including household income transferred to government in exchange for
new government bonds. The labour tax rate is determined by the ﬁscal rule
τL,t − τ¯L = fb

bt
4yt
−
b¯
4y¯

, (18)
where fb is the feedback coeﬃcient on the debt-to-GDP ratio. The monetary policy rule is given
by
it = ((2− β)πt)
πt
π¯
mπ ℓt
ℓ¯
mℓ
Sintt , (19)
where mπ is the inﬂation gap feedback coeﬃcient, mℓ is the loans gap feedback coeﬃcient and
Sintt is a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process for monetary policy shocks. The target real interest
rate 2− β is consistent with the economy’s steady state real interest rate, and the target for gross
inﬂation is π¯. The Taylor principle corresponds to mπ > 0.
4.6. Market Clearing and GDP
The goods market clearing condition is
yt = ct + It + gt +Gp,t +GI,t . (20)
The market clearing condition for physical capital is
Kt = kt−1 . (21)
And ﬁnally, GDP is deﬁned as
gdpt = ct + It + gt . (22)
4.7. Calibration
Table 3 presents the details of our model calibration. It distinguishes between calibrated
parameter values in the ZLB-constrained economy (fourth column) and in the unconstrained
economy (ﬁfth column). The discount factor β is set to ﬁx the steady state real policy interest rate
at 3% per annum in both models. The nominal and real rates are equal in steady state because
the central bank’s net inﬂation target equals 0% per annum. Keeping the steady state policy rate
equal across models has the advantage of implying very similar steady state real variables as we
move from high-interest unconstrained to low-interest ZLB-constrained economies.15 Instead of
diﬀerences in the steady state policy rate, distinctions between unconstrained and
15Otherwise there would for example be very large diﬀerences in steady state capital stocks.
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ZLB-constrained models are assumed to be due to diﬀerences in the steady state deposit interest
rate. We specify three models that diﬀer by the value taken by that rate, an unconstrained model
with a rate of 1% per annum, a ZLB-constrained model with a 0% rate, and a hypothetical
unconstrained model with a -1% rate. The ﬁrst and third models are used to calibrate two sets of
the parameters of the loan supply cost function (2), ℓ¯tgt, κ and ξ. For the third model these three
parameters are then applied to the ZLB-constrained model. The idea is that a “fundamental”
loan supply cost function can be identiﬁed from the unconstrained model under the assumption
that deposit rates can become negative, and that the ZLB does not aﬀect this function but
instead forces the economy’s steady state, and especially banks’ lending volume, to adjust to the
constraint given this function. In both unconstrained economies the elasticity parameters ξ are
set to ﬁx the steady state spread semi-elasticity of loan supply at 10 in the baseline, and at 5 and
1 in two alternatives. The parameters κ are set to ﬁx the steady state real deposit rates at 1%
and -1% per annum, respectively, while the steady state levels of loans ℓ¯tgt are determined by loan
demand at that interest rate. The implied interest semi-elasticities of the ZLB-constrained model
are slightly higher than in the corresponding unconstrained model, at 11.9, 6.3 and 1.3,
respectively. This small diﬀerence has no signiﬁcant eﬀects on our simulation results.
The remainder of the calibration applies equally to both models. For preferences, households’
intertemporal elasticity of substitution equals ǫ = 0.5, the habit persistence parameter equals
v = 0.75, and the weight χ on hours in the utility function is set to normalise steady state labour
supply to 1. For technologies, the production function parameter α is set to ﬁx the steady state
ratio of labour income to GDP at 60%, and the depreciation rate δ is set to ﬁx the
investment-to-GDP ratio at 20%. Both are in line with recent US data. We calibrate the steady
state government spending to GDP ratio at 18%, and the steady state level of the labour income
tax rate is set to be consistent with a steady state government debt to GDP ratio of 100%. The
calibration of the investment adjustment cost parameter φI = 2.5 follows Christiano et al. (2005).
The steady state gross markup, in line with much of the New Keynesian literature, is set to
µ = 1.1, and the degree of price stickiness to φp = 200. Together these values imply a contract
duration of 5 quarters in an equivalent Calvo (1983) model. In the ﬁscal policy rule the debt
feedback coeﬃcient is set to fb = 0.1. In the monetary policy rule the baseline inﬂation gap and
loans gap feedback coeﬃcients are ﬁxed at mπ = 3.0 and mℓ = 0. We will perform sensitivity
analysis for both of these coeﬃcients. The persistence of ﬁrst-order autoregressive shocks in our
simulations is ρc = 0.7 for consumption (habit persistence imparts additional persistence to this
shock), ρa = 0.95 for technology, ρℓ = 0.9 for loan supply and ρint = 0.9 for shocks to the
monetary policy rule.
5. Model Simulations
In this section we discuss impulse responses that ﬁrst (in the top half of each ﬁgure) illustrate the
behaviour of the ZLB-constrained economy as a function of the spread semi-elasticity of loan
supply, and that then (in the bottom half of each ﬁgure) compare the behaviour of the
ZLB-constrained economy to an otherwise identical unconstrained economy. In each case the
black solid, blue dashed and red dotted lines show simulations for the ZLB-constrained economy
with spread semi-elasticities of 10/5/1, while the green dashed line shows the simulation for the
unconstrained economy with a spread semi-elasticity of 10. The ﬁrst subsection illustrates why in
a ZLB-constrained economy systematic reductions in the nominal policy rate in response to lower
inﬂation are contractionary and why the Phillips curve becomes much ﬂatter than in the
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unconstrained economy. The second subsection illustrates how in a ZLB-constrained economy a
policy of deliberately increasing inﬂation and therefore the nominal policy rate, either through
exogenous shocks to the policy reaction function or through a policy reaction function with an
endogenous response to the loans gap, can have strong expansionary eﬀects by stimulating bank
lending. In the ZLB-constrained economy we limit ourselves to simulating shocks that are small
enough for the economy to not be close to transitioning to the unconstrained economy and vice
versa.
5.1. Reductions in the Policy Rate Are Contractionary Near the ZLB
This subsection studies three shocks that have a disinﬂationary eﬀect, and that therefore trigger a
reduction in the nominal policy rate through the systematic component of the monetary policy
rule. While this response has well-known output-stabilising eﬀects in an unconstrained economy,
it unambiguously reduces output in a ZLB-constrained economy unless the spread semi-elasticity
of loan supply is extremely low. The reason is that even for moderately low semi-elasticities the
eﬀect of lower policy rates on the quantity of credit and money dominates other eﬀects, including
the eﬀects of changes in the real interest rate.
5.1.1. Consumption Demand Shock
The top half of Figure 4 shows the simulated eﬀects of a shock to consumption preferences Sct
whereby consumption in the ZLB-constrained economy drops by around 1.4% on impact. The
shock leads to a reduction in the demand for capital and labour that triggers a reduction in wages
and user costs and therefore, ceteris paribus, in inﬂation. However, the overall impact on inﬂation
also depends on the credit rationing constraint, which in turn depends on the relative eﬀect of the
shock on the demand and supply of credit. By the deposits-in-advance constraint the drop in
aggregate demand reduces the demand for credit. But by the monetary policy rule the reduction
in inﬂation leads to a drop in the policy rate that reduces the lending spread and thereby the
supply of credit. When credit supply is highly elastic with respect to the lending spread, a
decrease in the policy rate leads to an especially strong decrease in the supply of credit. The drop
in credit supply is therefore larger than the drop in credit demand, thereby increasing the credit
rationing multiplier and, ceteris paribus, marginal cost. This partly oﬀsets the drop in wages and
user costs and thus makes inﬂation fall by less under more elastic credit supply, while output,
which is directly constrained by the quantity of credit and money, falls by more. On the other
hand, when credit supply is less elastic, the reduction in credit supply is smaller while the
increase in credit demand is larger. The latter occurs because the credit rationing component of
marginal cost increases less strongly so that the inﬂation rate drops by more, which in turn leads
to a stronger drop in the real policy rate and thus a ceteris paribus stimulus to aggregate demand
and thereby to the demand for credit. It can be shown that if the spread semi-elasticity of loan
supply becomes even smaller than in Figure 4, speciﬁcally as it drops below 0.5, the credit
rationing multiplier drops on impact rather than rising.
The reason why interest rates and therefore lending spreads drop in response to the shock is that
we have assumed a conventional Taylor rule with a positive feedback coeﬃcient on the inﬂation
gap. What Figure 4 shows is that at the ZLB this type of systematic policy is contractionary
ceteris paribus due to the credit channel. In subsection 5.2.2 we will discuss how a diﬀerent
monetary policy rule can modify this outcome.
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The bottom half of Figure 4 shows the same shock as the top half. It compares the
ZLB-constrained and unconstrained economies, in each case with a spread semi-elasticity of 10.
Because the shock to consumption preferences is identical, the consumption responses are similar,
but otherwise the results are strikingly diﬀerent. For the unconstrained economy the eﬀect of the
credit component 1/

1− it + i
d
t

on marginal cost is negligible and does not oﬀset the drop in
wages and user costs. As a result, the drop in inﬂation is much larger despite a much smaller drop
in wages and user costs, and leads to a large drop in the nominal and real policy rate. But this is
accompanied by a similar drop in the deposit rate, with the result that the eﬀect on the lending
spread is smaller than in the ZLB-constrained economy, and only reﬂects the lower marginal cost
of lending after the drop in consumption demand and therefore in in credit demand. The absence
of credit rationing leaves banks free to supply the quantity of credit demanded by ﬁrms, while
lower real policy rates stimulate aggregate demand and thereby the demand for credit. Both limit
the contractionary output eﬀects of the shock, with a smaller drop in consumption and a strong
increase rather than a decrease in investment. For the ZLB-constrained economy, credit rationing
has a large negative eﬀect on output. As for inﬂation, the larger drop in output leads to a much
larger drop in wages and user costs, but this is accompanied by an oﬀsetting increase in the credit
rationing component of marginal cost, with the net result of a much more subdued inﬂation
response. In other words, the Phillips curve of the ZLB-constrained economy is much ﬂatter than
that of the unconstrained economy when we use our estimated value of the spread semi-elasticity.
As discussed above, this changes as the elasticity drops towards zero. It can be shown that at an
elasticity of around 0.5 the magnitudes of the inﬂation and output responses become similar to
those of the unconstrained economy, but that elasticity is far outside the range suggested by our
data.
5.1.2. Technology Shock
The top half of Figure 5 shows the simulated eﬀects of a persistent shock to Sat whereby total
factor productivity increases by 1.0% on impact. In the ZLB-constrained economy this otherwise
expansionary shock nevertheless leads to an output drop of almost 0.6% after 6 quarters. The
reason is that an expansionary technology shock ceteris paribus reduces inﬂation and therefore,
due to the monetary policy rule, the policy rate, the lending spread and credit, which in turn
dampens the eﬀect on inﬂation. With less elastic credit supply we again observe less credit
rationing, more stable output and a larger drop in inﬂation.
The bottom half of Figure 5 shows that in the unconstrained economy the favourable technology
shock is indeed expansionary. The dominant eﬀect on inﬂation is the drop in wages and user
costs, with a negligible contribution of the credit component 1/

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on marginal cost.
While this leads to a signiﬁcant reduction in the nominal policy rate, the deposit rate drops by
even more, thereby allowing the lending spread to rise and giving banks an incentive to supply
the additional credit and money that is needed by an economy that tries to realise the potential
of improved technology.
5.1.3. Loan Supply Shock
The top half of Figure 6 shows the simulated eﬀects, in the ZLB-constrained economy, of a
persistent shock to ℓtgtt whereby the autonomous loan supply increases by just under 2% on
impact. The shock relaxes the credit rationing constraint and thereby reduces marginal cost and
inﬂation, while increasing output by around 0.2% after one year in the baseline, and by 0.4% and
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0.9% in the scenarios with lower spread semi-elasticity of loan supply. Because the primary eﬀect
of the shock is to increase credit, it remains expansionary despite the fact that, due to the
monetary policy rule, lower inﬂation triggers a drop in the policy rate and in the lending spread,
which ceteris paribus reduces credit. With less elastic credit supply we observe a stronger
relaxation of the credit rationing constraint because the drop in the lending spread only leads to a
small reduction in credit. As a result inﬂation drops by more while output increases more strongly.
The bottom half of Figure 6 shows that in the unconstrained economy an increase in the deposit
interest rate oﬀsets most of the eﬀects of the shock on credit, so that both the drop in inﬂation
and the increase in output are much smaller than in the ZLB-constrained economy.
5.2. Inﬂationary Policies Are Highly Expansionary Near the ZLB
This subsection studies three policies that have an inﬂationary eﬀect, and that therefore trigger
an increase in the nominal policy rate, the lending spread, credit, money and output. A
short-term expansionary eﬀect of temporary inﬂationary policies is of course not a surprising
result. The point is rather that in a ZLB-constrained economy such policies have a far greater
expansionary eﬀect because they reduce the severity of credit rationing. Furthermore, in a
ZLB-constrained economy permanent inﬂationary policies, which have virtually no real eﬀect in
an unconstrained economy, have a very strong and permanent eﬀect on output.
5.2.1. Temporary Monetary Policy Shock
The top half of Figure 7 shows a shock to the monetary policy rule Sintt that would, in the absence
of an interest rate response to inﬂation, lead to a 2.4% per annum reduction in the policy rate. In
the ZLB-constrained baseline economy this shock leads to an increase in output by around 1%
after one year. The reason is that the lower real interest rate stimulates strong increases in
consumption and investment demand, and that credit and money accommodate this expansion
because the immediate increase in inﬂation leads to an increase in the nominal policy rate and the
lending spread.16 With less elastic credit supply we observe a weaker relaxation of the credit
rationing constraint. As a result inﬂation increases by more while output increases less strongly.
The bottom half of Figure 7 shows that in the unconstrained economy the stimulus eﬀect of the
shock is not ampliﬁed by a credit channel, as the nominal deposit rate follows the policy rate to
keep the lending spread nearly constant. The expansionary eﬀects of the shock are now solely
driven by a short-lived reduction in the real interest rate.
5.2.2. Changes to the Monetary Policy Rule
The simulations in Figures 4-7 emphasise that at the ZLB, while systematic reductions in the
nominal policy rate in response to disinﬂationary shocks are contractionary, policies that generate
inﬂation and a higher nominal policy rate independently of shocks are expansionary. This raises
two questions: First, would a weaker systematic response to inﬂation mitigate the contractionary
eﬀects? Second, could a systematic response to other gap variables stabilise output more
eﬀectively? Figure 8 shows that the answer to the ﬁrst question is no while the answer to the
second question is yes.
16The credit rationing multiplier increases in the impact period because the lending spread and therefore credit
supply does not rise as fast as consumption and investment and therefore credit demand.
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The top half of Figure 8 studies the same shock to consumption demand as in Figure 4, in the
ZLB-constrained economy and with a spread semi-elasticity of loan supply of 10. It varies the
inﬂation gap feedback coeﬃcient mπ from 3 to 1.5 to 0.1. This ﬁgure shows that with a weaker
inﬂation response the inﬂation rate drops by slightly more following the shock while the policy
rate exhibits virtually no change. The main change is therefore a slightly smaller drop in the real
policy rate, while there is virtually no change in the lending spread and credit. The slightly
higher real policy rate in turn implies a slightly larger initial decline in investment and output.
This clearly does not support a policy of responding less strongly to inﬂation.
The bottom half of Figure 8 again studies the same shock, but in this case varies the loans gap
feedback coeﬃcient mℓ from 0 to 2 to 8. With a positive loans gap coeﬃcient mℓ, when banks
reduce credit due to insuﬃcient lending spreads, this ceteris paribus triggers a systematic
(rules-based) reduction in the policy rate, thereby generating the same immediate inﬂationary
response that we observed for the non-systematic monetary policy shock of Figure 7. Therefore,
the actual policy rate, and therefore lending spreads and credit, increase relative to the case of
mℓ = 0. This signiﬁcantly reduces credit rationing while permitting a larger drop in the real
policy rate due to higher inﬂation. The combination of both eﬀects implies a much shallower
contraction, speciﬁcally a smaller drop in consumption and an increase rather than a drop in
investment. Near the ZLB a monetary policy response to the loans gap therefore becomes a
powerful countercyclical tool.
Figure 9 studies the determinacy properties of the monetary policy rule (19) as a function of the
feedback coeﬃcients mπ and mℓ. We begin with the bottom plot for the unconstrained economy,
which shows that the Taylor principle holds at mℓ = 0, but that a slightly weaker inﬂation
response becomes possible as mℓ grows. The reason is that an interest rate response to the loans
gap can substitute for a response to inﬂation, because a drop in loans, by (3), implies a drop in
the credit rationing component of marginal cost 1/

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. But this eﬀect is weak given the
small role played by the credit rationing component in the determination of inﬂation. For the
same reason, with a strong inﬂation feedback at mπ = 3 any loans gap feedback is compatible
with determinacy. The picture for the ZLB-constrained economy in the top half of Figure 9 is
very diﬀerent. Here the loans gap becomes much more important, with mℓ ≥ 0 required except at
extremely high inﬂation gap coeﬃcients. More importantly, as long as mℓ ≥ 0 the inﬂation gap
coeﬃcient can become negative, with only a very weak requirement on the overall response to
inﬂation of 1 +mπ > 0. In other words, an interest rate response to the loans gap can substitute
for a response to inﬂation, because the credit rationing component of marginal cost plays a much
bigger role in the determination of inﬂation.
5.2.3. Permanent Increase in the Inﬂation Target
Because a ZLB-constrained economy operates permanently below capacity, speciﬁcally below the
capacity that it could attain in the absence of credit rationing, additional credit and money can
increase the economy’s output. But this immediately raises the question of why such a policy
would be pursued by means of temporary shocks as in Figure 7, or of temporary responses to
temporary shocks as in Figure 8, rather than by policies that permanently improve banks’ lending
margins. This is the subject of our ﬁnal simulation in Figure 10, which studies the eﬀects of
permanently increasing the nominal policy rate for a given equilibrium real interest rate, through
a permanent increase in the inﬂation target in the monetary policy rule. In Figure 10 we assume
that the policymaker increases this target, immediately and permanently, by 0.25 percentage
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points. The ﬁgure shows the eﬀects of this policy under lending spread semi-elasticities of 5 and
1. As we argued above, for permanent policy changes one should take into account that the
longer-run semi-elasticity would likely not be as high as the short-run semi-elasticity, because in
the long run banks can at least partly adapt their business models to lower lending spreads.
As shown in the top half of Figure 10, the eﬀect of this policy is to immediately stimulate an
increase in inﬂation that is initially even larger than 0.25 percentage points. This leads to
increases in the nominal policy rate and the lending spread, and therefore supports an increase in
credit that depends on the spread semi-elasticity, with the increase reaching more than 4% on
impact and 1.5% in the long run for the case of a semi-elasticity of 5, and under 0.5% for the
semi-elasticity of 1. This in turn permits similar long-run increases in output, for what is a very
modest increase in inﬂation.
6. Conclusions
We have studied an inﬁnite-horizon New Keynesian model with endogenous creation of bank
deposits through bank loans, subject to an increasing marginal cost of lending. Banks do not
intermediate commodity deposits between savers and borrowers, instead they oﬀer a payment
system that intermediates ledger-entry deposits between spenders and spenders. This monetary
exchange never settles into permanent saver-borrower relationships, instead deposits created at
the beginning of each period are extinguished at the end of the period, when the original deposit
has circulated back to the original borrower-depositor through a chain of payments. Banks are
essential for economic activity, not only because the payment system is essential but also because
additional deposit creation increases non-banks’ aggregate purchasing power beyond their income
alone. In other words, non-banks as a whole do not face a budget constraint whereby their
expenditure has to equal their income, instead they face a deposits-in-advance constraint whereby
their expenditure has to equal their income plus net new deposit creation, and where additional
deposits can mobilise additional resources and thereby create additional income. This implies
that any friction that prevents banks from elastically supplying deposits can have important real
economic consequences. The friction that we study in this paper is the zero lower bound (ZLB)
on deposit interest rates, in an economy where lending interest rates move towards zero with the
policy rate and therefore compress lending spreads. After calibrating our model with the sizeable
semi-elasticity of loan supply with respect to the lending spread that we estimated from US data,
and even calibrating it with much more moderate semi-elasticities, we ﬁnd that, once deposit
rates have reached the ZLB, any further drop in the policy rate ceteris paribus signiﬁcantly
reduces loan/deposit creation and ultimately real activity. Therefore, when interest rate setting
follows a conventional monetary policy reaction function that responds to disinﬂationary shocks
by lowering the policy rate, this has much more serious eﬀects on output than away from the
ZLB. The policy response needs to take this into account, either by countercyclically responding
to a loans gap in addition to an inﬂation gap, or by permanently increasing the inﬂation target in
order to permanently stimulate deposit creation and output. We also ﬁnd that at the ZLB
Phillips curves are ﬂatter, because when lower wage and user cost inﬂation lead to a reduction in
policy rates, this leads to credit rationing that both has an oﬀsetting inﬂationary eﬀect and a
sizeable negative eﬀect on output. The oﬀsetting inﬂationary eﬀect is due to the fact that credit
rationing leads ﬁrms to raise prices, in the expectation of generating additional revenue that
allows them to relax their credit rationing constraint.
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The model used in this paper has been kept simple to focus on the key mechanisms at work. A
key conclusion is that frictions that impede the banking system’s creation of deposit money can
have large and permanent eﬀects on the real economy. The only friction we have studied is the
ZLB, but there are many other candidates, especially the many new regulations that have
recently been imposed on banks. We want to use our framework to study these next, after
embedding a more detailed model of the banking sector in our model.
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Table 1. Data Description
Name Explanation Nature of the variable
Lnrealciloan Natural log of the real balance of Dependent variable
commercial and industrial loans (USD mil)
cispreadnet Commercial and industrial lending spread, Endogenous variable
net of charge-oﬀs (%)
PMI Purchasing Manager Index Candidate IV
INV E Nonﬁnancial business investment Candidate IV
DEMAND Percentage of banks reporting stronger loan
demand to large and medium ﬁrms Candidate IV
liquidity (Securities+cash+repo)/Total Assets of banks Control
supply Percentage of banks reporting tightening loan
standards to large and medium ﬁrms" Control
∆gdp Real GDP growth rates Control
Table 2. Estimation Results (2SLS)
First-Stage Regression
cispreadnett Coeﬃcient t P>|t| 95% Conﬁdence Interval
∆gdp∗t−1 0.402 3.13 0 (0.146, 0.659)
liquidity∗t−1 -0.219 -9.01 0 (-0.267,-0.170)
supplyt−1 -0.003 -0.82 0.42 (-0.0120,0.004)
DEMAND∗t−4 0.022 8.06 0 (0.017,0.028)
cons∗ 9.166 10.51 0 (7.43,10.905)
Second-Stage Regression
Lnrealciloant Coeﬃcient t P>|t| 95% Conﬁdence Interval
cispreadnet∗t 0.108 4.94 0 (0.064, 0.152)
∆gdp∗t−1 -0.075 -3.1 0 (-0.123, -0..026)
liquidity∗t−1 0.056 8.76 0 (0.043, 0.069)
supply∗t−1 0.003 5.03 0 (0.002, 0.004)
cons∗ 0.448 1.77 0.8 (-0.056, 0.951)
Summary Statistics
Number of Observations: 75
Adjusted R2: 0.703
Root MSE: 0.612
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Table 3. Model Calibration
Description Calibration Parameter ZLB-Constrained Unconstrained
Target Value Value
Real Policy Interest Rate (p.a.) 3% β 0.9925 0.9925
Real Deposit Interest Rate (p.a.) 0% / 1% κ 0.0100 0.0050
Credit Supply Elasticity 10 ξ 0.3988 0.1988
Intertemporal El. of Substitution ǫ 0.5 0.5
Consumption Habit v 0.75 0.75
Labor Supply Elasticity 1.0 1.0
Labor Supply 1 χ 0.3123 0.2669
Labor Income Share 60% α 0.3242 0.3367
Investment/GDP 20% δ 0.0171 0.0144
Government Spending/GDP 18% g¯ 0.5849 0.6845
Government Debt/GDP 100% τ¯L 0.3498 0.3498
Investment Adjustment Cost φI 2.5 2.5
Steady State Price Mark-up 10% µ 1.1 1.1
Inﬂation Adjustment Cost φp 200 200
Fiscal Debt Gap Feedback fb 0.1 0.1
Policy Rate Inﬂation Feedback mπ 3.0 3.0
Policy Rate Loans Feedback mℓ 0 0
Shock Persistence: Sct ρc 0.70 0.70
Shock Persistence: Sat ρa 0.95 0.95
Shock Persistence: ℓtgtt ρℓ 0.90 0.90
Shock Persistence: Sintt ρint 0.90 0.90
Figure 1. US Inﬂation Rate and Unemployment Rate during Recessions (IMF WEO 2013)
(relative to ﬁrst year of sample)
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Figure 2. US Commercial and Industrial Loan Spreads
Figure 3. Timing of Intra-Period Cash Flows
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Figure 4. Consumption Demand Shock
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Figure 5. Technology Shock
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Figure 6. Loan Supply Shock
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Figure 7. Exogenous Inﬂationary Policies I: Temporary Monetary Policy Shock
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Figure 8. Systematic/Rules-Based Inﬂationary Policies and Consumption Demand Shock
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Figure 9. Determinacy Regions for ZLB-Constrained and Unconstrained Economies
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Figure 10. Exogenous Inﬂationary Policies II: Permanent Inﬂation Target Shock
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